Operation 1027 and its Impacts on Myanmar’s Political Landscape

Introduction

On October 27, 2023, the three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA), namely the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and the Arakan Army (AA), along with other allied forces launched the military “Operation 1027”. The 3BHA statement lists the military objectives of ‘Operation 1027’ as combating widespread online fraud and gambling, asserting their right to self-defense, maintaining control over their territory, and ultimately eradicating oppressive junta military rule. Since fighting began, border trade with China has effectively halted, particularly trade through the Muse and Chinshwehaw border gates, which together ordinarily account for 91 percent of total border trade between China and Myanmar.

In the operation, the 3BHA forces occupied Kyu Koke (Pang Hseng) as well as Chinshwehaw, and Namhkan, where two of the three planned Cross-border Economic Cooperation Zones to be built by China in northern Myanmar are located. These projects are part of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) scheme. The armed challengers have thus seized complete control of the areas important to the future development of CMEC and partial control of at least seven Chinese project sites. These include the planned locations of projects such as the Mandalay-Muse railroad, China-Myanmar oil and gas pipeline, the cross-border power grid, and the Gokteik viaduct replacement and the highway expansion project which is scheduled to better connect Nawnghkio (Naung Cho) and Lashio towns on the Mandalay-Muse Highway. In Rakhine State also, the Arakan Army took over almost the northern part of the state and Paletwa from Chin State.

At the same time, acting President of the State Administration Council (SAC), Myint Swe evaluated the situation in the recent National Defence and Security Council (NDSC) meeting on November 8, by saying “if the government does not effectively manage the incidents happening in the border region, the country will be split into parts.” Subsequently, on January 12, 2024, 3BHA announced the three outcomes of the "Haigeng Agreement," which facilitated a ceasefire in northern shan state, brokered through talks mediated by China in Kunming, PRC.

If the government does not effectively manage the incidents happening in the border region, the country will be split into parts.

Historical Precedents

Recent conflict history in northern Shan State has shown that significant shifts often occur rapidly when China’s interests in Myanmar reach a pivotal point. Conflict actors in Myanmar, whether they are state or non-state actors vying for complete or partial power, can capitalize on this opportune moment by acting decisively. Essentially, the key is for Myanmar conflict actors to take action when China’s interest in Myanmar is at its peak. To demonstrate, in 1988-89, when Kokang and Wa ethnic armed forces rebelled against the leadership of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB), Deng Xiaoping’s China, which had been recently successful with reforming towards a market-based economy system and experimental opening to international trade, reversing their previous patronage with the CPB leadership.

Conflict actors in Myanmar, whether they are state or non-state actors vying for complete or partial power, can capitalize on this opportune moment by acting decisively.

The person who most effectively seized the moment of this watershed opportunity presented by China’s backflip was the intelligence chief of the former junta, State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), Brig. Gen. Khin Nyunt. At this critical juncture. Khin Nyunt made a groundbreaking proposition to the Kokang and Wa forces—an unprecedented move in Myanmar’s history. He made a proposal to the armed groups in northern Myanmar, that they be permitted to continue to hold their weapons but enter into ceasefire, collaborating with the junta for regional development, and that in return they would be permitted to engage in any business activities they liked to raise revenue, whether that be illicit drug trafficking or money laundering, they would be free from interference from the ruling junta. This new ceasefire initiative of the military intelligence developed into an institutionalized ‘ceasefire crony capitalism’ in the period that followed. This new attempt at a form of ceasefire changed the landscape of conflict not only in northern Myanmar but also across the whole nation.

The rapid growth of the Arakan Army (AA) can also be understood through this ‘China opportunity’ lens. After Myanmar’s 2010-11 political transition, the hybrid civilian government in September 2011 unexpectedly suspended billions of dollars worth of Chinese investment dam project at the Myitkyina site at the Ayeyarwaddy River confluence in Kachin State. More importantly, China’s concerns grew as U Thein Sein’s administration became more friendly with various Western governments. China had previously been pursuing deep strategic interests with Myanmar, particularly through the Kyauk Phyu deep-water seaport, which also included a Special Economic Zone (SEZ), as a form of Chinese access to the Indian Ocean, as well as China’s oil and gas pipeline which passes through Rakhine State to inland China’s Yunnan Province. China could probably foresee strategic opportunities in northern Shan State and in Rakhine State, not only to expand its economic interests but also to expand its state reach in order to guarantee security to its projects. The conflict actor who took advantage of this situation was Gen. Twan Mrat Naing, chief of the Arakan Army (AA). When the AA was founded in 2009, its force numbered only 29 men, but after the event of suspension of the Myitsone Dam project in 2011, and after relocating their major forces into Rakhine State in 2014, the AA subsequently strengthened and its numbers swelled to several thousand troops. The AA has since become the second-largest ethnic armed organization (EAO) after the UWSA.

China’s Influence in Operation 1027

In analyzing ‘Operation 1027,’ the Kokang forces and their allies, and specifically the three Brotherhood Alliance, have effectively mobilized themselves and embarked upon a mission-centric objective which does align with China’s own concerns over the eradication of ‘Kyar Phyant’ (诈骗)– online fraud, and gambling. China’s rhetorical intolerance towards cyber-scams, which have victimized thousands of its citizens, is a driving force behind China’s agenda. Within Chinese society, the issue of online scams and slavery within illicit border-zone cartels gained prominence immediately after the release of the blockbuster film ‘No More Bets.’ Chinese citizens’ concerns and criticism created a hot issue for Chinese authorities. While Chinese officials have raised the issue seriously with the Myanmar junta many times, the junta has seemingly been either inattentive or has treated the problem lightly. Moreover, Chinese authorities have given time to Bai Xuoqiang of the Kokang Self-Administered Zone, however no results have materialized. Worse still, up to October 20, 2023, reportedly about 60 Chinese citizens have been killed in the Kokang area, including undercover Chinese police. Bai Xuoqiang has seemingly defied Chinese warnings, by emphasizing his association with the SAC Chief in political and business matters. This is tantamount to Bai challenging China’s attempts to impose pressure on the Kokang leader.

In terms of the Wa region, China is seemingly disgruntled with the rise of new generational leadership in the UWSP, as these new leaders seem more nationalistically inclined. China may feel that the new Wa leadership might become less open to listening to China’s perspectives and wishes in the region. This could be the main reason behind why Chinese authorities themselves have become involved in extra-territorial arrests of Kokang, and some Wa leaders, and issuing warrants against those who are alleged to have committed criminal activities under Chinese law. These arrests aimed to shake up Wa’s leadership under the claim of their involvement in the Kyar Phyant online gambling industry. China appears to selectively target only Kokang and Wa leaders, while appearing satisfied with Mong La leaders, suggesting reliance on Mong La. In a broader perspective, while Kyar Phyant is now an immediate issue in northern Myanmar, the longer-term horizon raises a hypothesized scenario in which China is actively engaged in reconfiguring its power projection capabilities in the area. The immediate focus on Kyar Phyant could be a strategy to address multiple concerns simultaneously. To comprehend the interplay between China’s short-term and long-term strategies in northern Myanmar, attention must be directed not only to security matters but also to the intertwining economic interests of China in the region.

A more thorough analysis of the assumption of China’s role in internal power reconfigurations in northern Shan State could consider the following scenarios and projections: 1) China may intend to replace the present Kokang leader Bai Xuoqiang with new leadership; 2) China may send a ‘Do and Do Not’ message to the UWSA leadership, using the immediate issue of Kyar Phyant online gambling against the background context of rising Wa nationalism; and finally, 3) China could strengthen its interests east of the Salween River, by reinforcing demographic (ethnic population ratios) and economic power. In conclusion, the ongoing ‘Operation 1027’ in Kokang is a convergence of China’s interests and the MNDAA’s goal of reclaiming control over Laukkai. The strategic aim of the operation may involve reoccupying Laukkai as a base, while the stated objective of ‘eradicating the oppressive military rule in Myanmar’ could serve as a tactical agenda—a shrewd preemptive measure to garner popular support.

China may provide a ‘green light’ to ‘Operation 1027’, but it should be noted that conflict actors in Myanmar are not so passive or subjective as to act on signals from China. Myanmar actors have consistently demonstrated their own agency, and that they can reinvent their positions within the given situation to maximize their strategic options, from the strategic management of Khin Nyunt in 1989, to the strategic-sophisticated Twan Mrat Naing of the AA after 2011, to the recent military maneuvers of the 3BHA. History has demonstrated that these forces have the ability to seize opportunities, remold their positions to achieve more favorable conditions and that they are more than capable of producing results on their own terms. While conflicts as part of the current ‘Operation 1027’ have been raging broadly in at least eleven townships, the main target of the operation remains the re-occupation of Laukkai, while other battles’ objectives are to cut off supplies and reinforcements to the Myanmar military.

China may provide a ‘green light’ to ‘Operation 1027’, but it should be noted that conflict actors in Myanmar are not so passive or subjective as to act on signals from China.

Impact of Operation 1027 on Chinese Investments

Almost half of China’s total investment in Myanmar is in Northern Shan State and ‘Operation 1027’ has already had a direct impact on Chinese interests in the area. The potential impact of ‘Operation 1027’ on these investments is especially acute in Muse and Laukkaing townships where 3BHA forces now control the areas intended for developing the Chinshwehaw-Lincang and Muse-Ruili Cross-border Economic Cooperation Zones (CBECZ). The 3BHA advances also have the potential to directly impact other major projects of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), New International Land-Sea Trade Corridor (ILSTC), and Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC). Additionally, the combined average value of daily cross-border trade through Muse and Chinshwehaw border gates is valued at USD 8.91 million. If fighting in the area continues, downstream trade in Myanmar could encounter merchandise shortages, commodity scarcities, and rising prices, while trade partners in China could also face economic losses. For these reasons, if the current turmoil in Northern Shan State persists, Chinese economic interests are likely to be harmed.

The 3BHA advances also have the potential to directly impact other major projects of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), New International Land-Sea Trade Corridor (ILSTC), and Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC).

China appears dissatisfied with the current political and security power balance in Northern Shan State. Although ‘Operation 1027’ could lead to short-term regional instability in Northern Shan State, China may still tolerate it. The operation could help resolve the ‘Kyar Phyant’ (诈骗) online fraud and gambling gangs crisis in the short term. Moreover, the operation’s potential long-term impact on China’s goal to restructure the power balance in northern Myanmar might make it an acceptable move for China. If China’s economic strategy continues to prioritize gaining and preserving access to the Indian Ocean and exploiting the Salween River basin, and if China sees a new power balance to its liking emerge in the region, perceives a shift in the power balance that aligns with its interests in the region, it may utilize its influence to pressure all warring parties involved in the conflict to promptly cease hostilities and come to a negotiated settlement. Nevertheless, the various conflict actors in Myanmar might maintain their own military and political objectives, their own agency, and make their own calculations on whether the current conflict could escalate to an all-out war.

Currently, 3BHA forces have taken total control of the Chinshwehaw-Lancang Cross-Border Economic Cooperation Zone (CBECZ). The forces also partially controlled Namhkan and Kyu Koke (Pang Hseng) in Northern Shan State where Muse-Ruili CBECZ is planned to construct. The 3BHA and their allies also seized the about-to-operate Kunlong bridge which is important to China-Myanmar trade and planned Kunlong dam. In addition, 3BHA forces control Hseni Town situated on the main trade route2, and partially control other areas important to CMEC projects such as the Mandalay-Muse railroad, China-Myanmar oil and gas pipeline, the cross-border power grid, and the Gokteik viaduct replacement and the highway expansion project which is scheduled to better connect Nawnghkio and Lashio towns on the Mandalay-Muse Highway. In terms of numbers, since the start of ‘Operation 1027’ up until November 10, 3BHA and their allies have gained full control of five Chinese project sites planned and currently implemented, and also gained partial control of at least seven other sites where China projects are planned.

China’s response to ‘Operation 1027’ is rather different from its responses to the two most recent incidents of conflict on the border which occurred in 2015 and 2021. It is particularly noteworthy that China’s response this time is one of restraint, whereas previous responses were quite combative. This time China has formally urged relevant parties to ceasefire immediately, cooperate with Chinese authorities to ensure border security, and to take protection and security of China-Myanmar cooperation projects and enterprise personnel seriously. In the past, the Chinese government has directly sent out letters to the Myanmar military, to EAOs involved in the conflict, and called for an immediate ceasefire. At this time though, ISP-Myanmar finds China is only calling for its peace proposals through the media, and is not directly exerting pressure on the conflict parties. However, news reports indicate that China’s special envoy did meet with 3BHA representatives and KIO officers separately after ‘Operation 1027’ had been launched. ISP-Myanmar still needs to verify these reports, but it is reasonable to consider that China is prepared to accept some short-term instability caused by the ongoing conflict.

On the other hand, China can remain calm amidst the period of fighting as it wants to avoid comment or action while it assesses the potential outcomes of the offensive as well as monitors the situation of other forces that may be aligned with the northern EAOs. China might have access to information and internal developments regarding ‘Operation 1027’ since the warring EAOs enjoy close diplomatic relationships with local Chinese authorities. So far, ‘Operation 1027’ has not physically damaged any Chinese projects or interests, and has acted only within the necessities of the military operation. China is likely to be attentive to and assess the morale, capacity, and popular support of the armed challengers to the junta. A favorable outcome for China would involve the conflict not adversely affecting its economy, preserving the security of Chinese nationals in Myanmar, and having a hand in developing an incoming regional power structure which remains stable. Importantly, China would also aim to avoid triggering anti-Chinese sentiment among the Myanmar population. Presently, a significant number of Bamar youth involved in the conflict, along with some EAO leaders, have actively emphasized the self-help narrative of revolution, stating ‘this war is not particularly related to China; this is our own revolutionary fight.’ This sentiment would naturally avoid igniting anti-Chinese sentiment among the Myanmar population. The primary challenge for China will lie in either convincing Myanmar’s conflict actors to cease fighting or in applying the necessary pressure if they persist, when Chinese interests are met.

Escalation of Conflict and Political Landscape

‘Operation 1027’ has escalated the conflict in Myanmar to a new level. Since the post-coup Spring Revolution, the prospect of a political resolution restoring the pre-coup ‘old normal’ is no longer feasible. ‘Operation 1027’ has further entangled Myanmar’s conflict landscape with geopolitics, pushing the extant political power configuration and territorial integrity of the Myanmar polity beyond a mere status quo and into an irreversible trajectory. This shift is not contingent on Myanmar’s national democratic legitimacy or adherence to a federal framework. Rather, it indicates a declining ability of the state to function effectively. The state has lost control over its ability to maintain law and order, collect taxes from a struggling economy, enter into contracts with foreign governments regarding sovereign affairs, and deliver essential public services such as water, electricity and healthcare. As the state loses control over the territory, it loses the ability to exercise power effectively in terms of functional and territorial reach.

Humanitarian crises continue to worsen with no foreseeable international assistance to tackle them adequately in the near future. Youth resistance fighters have taken the opportunity of the crises facing the SAC to escalate “tipping-point armed revolution” under the slogan ‘wave after wave,’ referring to recurring and ongoing resistance movements. Their determination to secure victory has intensified. Whether or not these movements could lead to ‘total war’, which could remove the junta regime, is the key focus of ISP OnPoint No. 17, which has particularly highlighted the ‘signaling effects’ of the military operation and how this could be interpreted by Myanmar’s military officers, ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), and neighboring countries, including China, and further afield in some of the Western powers. Conflict stakeholders in Myanmar, such as EAOs, their supporters, and local and international allies, will calculate the direction of the winds of conflict and the strength of the conflict’s momentum to estimate how far the current movement will progress. Based on these calculations, their subsequent decisions on their involvement levels will shape the current movement’s course.

The immediate consequences of ‘Operation 1027’ demonstrate significant shortcomings in Myanmar military’s (SAC) preparedness, intelligence, battle readiness, morale, and popular support. The military finds itself overstretched across multiple fronts, rendering it fragile and vulnerable. Based on ISP-Myanmar’s findings, in the aftermath of ‘Operation 1027,’ at least eight SAC Regional Military Commands (RMC), at least four Regional Operations Commands (ROC), at least ten Light Infantry Divisions (LID) and at least nine Military Operations Commands (MOC) have been deployed to front line fighting to engage with various resistance forces groups and EAOs across 67 per cent of the country’s total area. SAC forces have now been spread so thin to the extent that additional support can no longer be supplied to these front line forces. SAC forces seem to be cornered in every direction. In addition, at least 20,000 to 25,000 security forces must be constantly held in reserve to respond to potential urban anti-junta demonstrations and the wider anti-junta movement. To this end, the SAC needs to maintain at least 15 to 20 battalions surrounding each major city, such as Naypyitaw and Yangon.

A standard infantry battalion structure typically consists of about 55-60 officers and around 650 soldiers, resulting in a total troop size of roughly 700. However, in reality, some battalions are formed with only around 300 soldiers, while many others are formed with just 230-250 soldiers. Worse still, most battalions are formed with fewer than 170 soldiers. When infantry battalions have only around 170 soldiers, approximately 35-40 are required to remain at the base camp, meaning that the operational forces available to go to the frontline are only around 130 soldiers per battalion. The accurate number of operational combatants in a given battalion could be further reduced due to soldiers being absent due to poor health, desertion, or arrest and imprisonment. Therefore, if a battalion can send even 110 combatants to the frontline, it can be considered a strong unit.

During ‘Operation 1027,’ Infantry Battalion No. 129 under the Laukkai Regional Operations Command (ROC) in Kokang area, based in Yan Khaunt village in Laukkai Township, Kokang Self-Administered Zone, surrendered to the resistance forces’ assault. News reports recorded that at the time, there were only 126 combatants in the battalion’s base and a total of 262 people, including combatants’ family members. Similarly, when Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) No. 125 surrendered in Kone Gyan, only 93 combatants were present. Considering the case of Infantry Battalion No. 129, if the number of soldiers who either died in action, deserted, or were arrested for wrongdoings are presumed not to be listed, and assuming the number of these people to be around 40-50, then the total formation of the battalion could only be at maximum 170. Of these, we can assume 30 to 40 percent of soldiers are made up of people in the age range of 40 to 50 or even older, making the actual number of effective soldiers closer to around a hundred.

The SAC fighting forces lie in stark contrast with the resistance forces. The majority of combatants from the Burma People’s Liberation Army (BPLA), People’s Liberation Army (PLA), People’s Defense Force (Mandalay), and Mogoke Tactical Command (PDF), who are fighting alongside 3BHA forces in ‘Operation 1027,’ are in the 20 to 30 year age range with high levels of aggression and battle readiness. In comparing numbers, a battalion of the People’s Defence Force (PDF) under the command of the National Unity Government (NUG) is reportedly formed with around 200 soldiers. In addition, the junta military units have not been able to expand their reach after the coup. Instead, they have been forced to remain in their limited operation zones due to security challenges, which has left them unable to secure the necessary resources and sustenance.

In addition, the junta military units have not been able to expand their reach after the coup. Instead, they have been forced to remain in their limited operation zones due to security challenges, which has left them unable to secure the necessary resources and sustenance.

Actually, the Myanmar military has been struggling to care for its personnel, allocating a significant portion of defense expenditures to heavy artillery and defense systems, which are not directly relevant to fighting a civil war within the country’s own territory. The increased procurement of weapons is a lucrative business for corrupt high-ranking military officials and has also proved profitable for arms dealers. On the other hand, ordinary soldiers seem abandoned and underfed. Recent images of junta soldiers captured in the resistance operation demonstrated them as feeble, undernourished, and seemingly in ill health. Many soldiers had been assigned to the frontlines for prolonged periods since before the 2021 coup. Some had been deployed to frontline fighting in the Kachin and Rakhine areas for five to seven years without leave or the ability to visit their families. This protracted operational deployment period has made them socially weak. In the two and a half years since the coup, military assignment for a soldier in a frontline base has become similar to serving prison-sentence since they cannot go out and meet people because of the population’s antagonism towards them and other security risks as multiple armed forces are waging attrition war against them. Moreover, seeing injured fellow soldiers on the frontlines receiving neither support nor rescue must surely be a frightening experience for the combatants, weakening their morale. The consequences of this lead to distrust of their commanding officers, thus deteriorating the effective command and control within units.

As the military lacks popular support, the junta forces fail to receive intelligence information and even their own information is leaked to the resistance. Moreover, it is apparent that the junta military has failed to keep up with technological advances. In ‘Operation 1027,’ the resistance forces have deployed a battle tactic of attacking with multiple synchronized drones and drone-delivered explosives. Against such drone attacks, the junta units either cannot effectively use their jamming systems to defend themselves or else the 3BHA forces can bypass the junta’s jamming systems. 3BHA forces have effectively deployed a shower of drone-delivered explosives, which have proven effective against the junta forces. In one example, the Division Commander of Light Infantry Division No. 99 was killed when drone-delivered explosives collapsed his bunker. The junta forces’ unpreparedness in the face of this new tactic left many soldiers no alternative but to surrender to their assailants. The junta military is currently facing a critical period, compelled to reassess and modify its strategy, tactics, defense mechanisms, and responses to counter the EAOs’ offensive. This requires a complete rethink of how to manage its forces in the military theatre. Essentially, the junta military is now confronting some of the most daunting operational challenges in its history. In essence, the short-term crises that the junta military have faced under ‘Operation 1027’ have clutched away the veil which had covered the military’s competence. In the medium term, the SAC is muddling its way into a series of crises without being capable of finding a political exit.

The Junta’s Dual Track Strategy

Through careful analysis of the past, it can be observed that the Myanmar military has often attempted to handle crises by employing a dual-track strategy. This strategy involves using violent means to suppress opposition while pursuing a political offensive pathway against them. If the junta fails to strike a balance between these two tracks, it cannot defeat its opposition while also maintaining a viable political exit strategy. By “pursuing a political offensive pathway,” we refer to a political strategy or plan that, regardless of whether the opposition or international community endorses it, eventually forces or co-opts the opposition and the international community by dividing or weakening them.

For example, after the brutal crackdown against the 1988 democracy uprising, the junta allowed opposition political parties to register and paved the way for a new general election in 1990. Again, after the 2003 attacks against Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s convoy in Depayin, the former junta fashioned a ‘new political roadmap’ in 2004, and similarly, after the suppression of the 2007 Saffron Revolution (the monk movement), the former junta enacted the 2008 State Constitution. However, unlike in the past, until now, the current junta has only deployed heavy-handed actions against first the 2021 Spring Revolution and now ‘Operation 1027.’ The junta, this time, has barely come up with any viable political paths to accommodate and divide the opposition. For worse, the SAC has also made the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) impotent.

The junta, this time, has barely come up with any viable political paths to accommodate and divide the opposition. For worse, the SAC has also made the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) impotent.

It is highly unlikely that the proposed elections by the SAC will take place due to the significant security risks and logistical challenges. Moreover, the election process does not meet the minimum requirements of a free and fair election, and the SAC’s election commission has made it difficult for parties to register. The general public is resentful about the recent violent crackdown and is unlikely to accept an election as a viable political solution. The main challenge for the SAC is whether to extend its term beyond January 31st, 2024, which marks the end of the junta’s three-year rule. Even if the military were to disband the SAC and set up a new body to oversee elections (by making some concessions such as releasing the imprisoned opposition leader, Aung San Suu Kyi), this would still fall short of addressing public grievances. In the medium term, any military defeat could lead the junta to restructure the balance of power among its top leadership or adjust its proposed roadmap. None of these questions can be ruled out for now.

Regarding the 3BHA’s ‘Operation 1027,’ in the short-term, the allied resistance group has pursued a limited military operation to reclaim Laukkai of the Kokang Self-Administered Zone as well as a general expansion of their areas of control. The 3BHA has also encouraged the entire country to mobilize to revolt against the junta’s military rule, which can be viewed as a tactical move in order to push the junta military forces to engage across multiple fronts and to reduce the ability to concentrate troops for any counter-offensive. However, this cannot be interpreted as engaging in a full-scale civil war with the objective of pushing for a complete victory against the junta.

One development worth observing is whether the weaponry and ammunition seized by the 3BHA since the beginning of ‘Operation 1027’ could be used to assault not only Laukkai and Hesni but also the junta’s North-eastern Military Command based in Lashio. Among the seized weaponry, the most destructive artillery pieces include the Israeli-made Soltam Systems M-71 155mm howitzer, the Soviet-made 122mm howitzer D-30 (GRAU index 2A18), Swedish-made Carl Gustaf 84mm recoilless rifles and US-made 75mm recoilless rifles. Similarly, captured 60mm, 81mm, and 120mm motor shells can be redeployed as drone-delivered explosives. 122mm and 105/130mm howitzers have a capacity for long-distance reach. According to reported photos, 3BHA forces have seized around 30 M20 75mm and Browning .50 caliber BMG machine guns, which are well-suited for use against Mi 17/35 attack helicopters. Notably, the resistance forces have also seized many anti-tank weapons, such as 81 mm mortars that are manufactured by the Myanmar military, as well as thousands of shells of ammunition.

Even if the war does not extend to a total war to remove the junta from power, ‘Operation 1027’ could still tip the balance of power in favor of the Northern Alliance in the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC). 3BHA forces have now come to presume that they can enjoy an equal military footing, at least with the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), and ‘Operation 1027’ will continue to weaken the control of other Shan EAOs over territory, power, and economic influence. This could lead to the expansion of the control area of 3BHA, increase their revenues by administering tax collection from border trade, and give them greater political influence, like princelings, at the expense of more seasoned EAOs in Kachin, Wa, and Shan.

It could be expected that the Karenni, Chin, Karen, and Kachin EAOs have joined the conflict in order to expand their control areas and seize new townships, strategic border gates, and trade routes. At the same time, the respective EAOs would likely be considering some defense mechanisms to prevent other armed forces from encroaching into their control areas. We are likely to see ceasefire agreements or cooperation agreements among different armed groups in Shan State, similar to the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS) and the Shan State Progressive Party (SSPP) ending hostilities and entering into cooperation agreements with each other or with other EAOs for regrouping and other alliance-formations. Some radical groups, particularly among urban Bamar youth, who emerged during the ‘Spring Revolution’, have been politically active alongside the ‘Operation 1027’ fighting and have vowed for a three-stage objective: (1) Support EAOs to reclaim and liberate their respective lands, (2) Build a new coming-together federal union from these lands, with each having equal status, and (3) In the case of individual ethnic groups not wanting to join the new union, allow for them to choose formal secession instead.

The participation of these radical groups alongside ‘Operation 1027’ has at least lent support to the military operational level as well as the mobilization of the political legitimacy narrative and the wider moral energy of the resistance movement. So far, these radical groups seem to be playing as supporting actors in terms of ‘Operation 1027’s’ strategy, military objectives, and political goals. Nevertheless, the political legitimacy and moral support they bring are crucial for the 3BHA. Without the connection to the Spring Revolution, the public may perceive the 3BHA as merely aiming to regain territory or expand their areas of control. In such a case, the EAOs would still receive support from their respective minority ethnic populations but find it challenging to gain nationwide support, which they currently enjoy. From the international community’s standpoint, these EAOs could be seen as pursuing secessionism or irredentism, making it difficult to support them. As it stands, the interests of the 3BHA leadership and Bamar radical groups may align in both the short and medium terms around the outcomes of ‘Operation 1027.’

In order for radical groups to successfully launch the revolutionary overthrow of the military junta and to win an all-out civil war, at least two or all three of the following conditions must be met: (1)The top military leadership must experience an elite split, a counter-coup, or a critical defection of forces within the military; (2) Major EAOs must form a strategic military alliance to continue fighting against the junta regime; (3) A foreign country or agency must exert effective coercive intervention against the military.

Even if a revolutionary overthrow were to happen by good fortune, the conflict actors would hardly be likely to secure a successful revolutionary transformation. History has shown us that revolutions in Russia, China, Cuba, Iran, post-Soviet states, and the Arab Spring often led to backsliding or were unable to drive social transformation. Myanmar faces an even more challenging task due to its multiple competing armed groups, high levels of poverty, and lack of positive experience in modern nation-building.

One significant theme in ‘Operation 1027’ is the ‘Homecoming of Kokang Brothers’ rhetoric. The word ‘home’ can refer to the place of one’s birth or childhood, a place of cherished memories, or the sentimental home of one’s mother. In such cases, there is little room for problems. However, when ‘home’ is interpreted based on ethnicity or race, or when ‘our home’ is exclusively defined as a nationalistic concept of home, then ‘homecoming’ can become problematic and politically inflammatory. For example, if a resident of Kutkai town wishes to return to their childhood home, it is a lovely idea. But if Kutkai is designated as the home of one particular ethnic group, it could spark tribalistic conflicts since several ethnic nationalities, such as Palaung, Shan, and Kachin, might be residing in the same township and claiming an exclusive sense of belonging and ownership. If the concept of home is defined by ethnicity, such rhetoric could lead to discrimination and conflict over who is the homeowner (the host) and who is the guest. The hospitality of a homeowner is presumed to be conditional, and problems could arise over perspectives such as ‘the guest should not insult the homeowner’ or ‘the guest shall not assume a dominant position.’ This perspective is parallel to the ultra-religious and nationalist group ‘Ma-Ba-Tha’ since the group has advocated for discriminating between ‘Buddhist homeowners’ and ‘all other guests.’ Therefore, even the first step of the Three Stage objective formulated by the radical Bamar youth groups, reclaiming their ‘own’ land, is easier said than done.

Observing public statements made by the leadership of 3BHA forces, their political objectives are unclear. In an open letter to the public dated October 27, despite mentioning the objectives of ‘striving relentlessly to eradicate the oppressive military dictatorship, to pursue national equality, and to construct a new peaceful and prosperous federal democratic Union,’ none of the constituent 3BHA forces subscribe the ‘Federal Democracy Charter’ adopted in collaboration with the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) and some EAOs, such as Karen, Karenni, and Chin. The October 27 open letter clearly defined the political situation as ‘our country turns out to be a government-less nation since the military coup.’ The 3BHA joint public statements for ‘Operation 1027’ did not use the term ‘federal democracy.’ The lack of use of the term is quite significant. Since the National League for Democracy (NLD) won the general election in 2015 to a time before the coup in 2021, the 3BHA’s joint statement regarding government did use terms such as “to successfully establish a federal democratic country”. This likely means that their political goals have changed. Instead, their ‘Operation 1027’ statement read “to protect the people’s livelihood, to self-defense, to control more of their region, to prevent airstrikes and heavy attacks by the SAC on our groups day and night, and to eradicate the military junta regime.” This agrees with the Arakan Army (AA)’s openly stated aspiration for confederation status in Myanmar. The 3BHA approach can be read as demonstrating a pragmatic political culture, one rather dissimilar to the approach of the NUCC. This may be because the 3BHA wants to avoid over-politicized and under-strategized plans.

Recommended Readings

(1) On Point 17 - Operation 1027: Will All Roads Lead to Laukkai or Naypyitaw?

(2) On Point 18 -Operation 1027: China’s Economic Entanglement With Anticipated And Unforeseen Risks

(3) On Point 19 -Operation 1027: The Need for a New Political Imagination and a Pragmatic Strategy.

(4) ISP Insight Email Vol 1. No (27) - Operation 1027 and Its Consequences

(5) ISP Insight Email Vol 1. No (28) - All Armed and on the Verge of Breakdown

(6) ISP Explainer - Misfortune for Kokang’s Bai Family ‘Operation 1027’ Affords China’s Growing Influence

(7) ISP Insight Email Vol 2. No (2) - THE RISE OF PRINCELINGS - 1, Fresh Faces of UWSP Leadership Emerge

(8) ISP Insight Email Vol 2. No (4) - THE RISE OF PRINCELINGS - 2, An Upturn of Ta'ang's Non-Royal Leadership (Ngattapa Min)